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Toward a Right of Control Over the City
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D. BARLOW BURKE, JR.*
Lawyers who have businessmen as clients often find that their
employers are specialists in the laws regulating their occupations. To
some degree, planners must also become specialists in laws affecting
them. This essay is aimed at such aspiring planners and lawyers. Its
purpose is to suggest an emerging jurisprudential approach to some
laws relating to urban affairs. Illustrations of this approach are taken
from many, seemingly diverse, types of planning laws. The reader is
asked to drop his expertise, which will tend to emphasize the unique
problems of each type, and look for essential similarities.
The goals set by Congress in the Omnibus Housing Act
of 1968 were based more on need than on what could be
accomplished. The act calls for six million low-cost units
over the next 10 years, 300,000 for the current year.
Mr. Romney said that he would do everything he could
to increase production but that it was obvious that the
300,000 goal for this year could not be met.
"We should stop making big promises we cannot meet
and leading people to false illusions and violence," he said.
"It's easy to trot out great, big grandiose programs as
has been done over the last several decades. This causes
frustration when those who are to receive the benefits have
their expectations raised and you are left worse off than you
were when you started."
The National Commission on Urban Problems, headed
by former Senator Paul H. Douglas, Democrat of Illinois,
recently reported that the goals set by the Housing Act of
1949 had still not been met and that the Federal Government
had demolished more housing since then than it had helped
build.**
Laws are passed for many reasons. The foregoing excerpt from a
New York Times article on George Romney's first news conference as
the new Secretary of Housing and Urban Development shows quite
clearly that some housing legislation promises the public more than
the mere enactment of a law can deliver. Such laws may be passed for
* Assistant Professor of Planning Law, University of Rhode Island; A.B. 1963, Harvard:
L.L.B. 1966, M.C.P. 1968. University of Pennsylvania: Member State Bar of Pennsylvania.
** Herbers. "'Romney Reports Review of Policy," New York Times I-eb. 5. 1969 at 23.
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political or hortatory purposes;' legislators know full well that their
goals cannot be achieved.' Other laws are passed for genuine social
welfare purposes. In either case, the law is passed because some
segment of the public recognizes a need for a law. Still other statutes
are passed to bestow rights on citizens in order to help courts solve
disputes over a public program which has produced or might produce
litigation. After all, one's lawyer can predict that his client has some
"right" in a program, but only by going to court can the client find
out definitely. Indeed, this is the only way to determine the scope of
any legal right. As Jerome Frank said so well:
What we are accustomed to describe as "legal rights",
then, apparently grow out of specific lawsuits and are to be
found in specific court-orders, judgments, or decrees. If no
court-order has as yet been entered with respect to any of
your legal rights or mine, then those rights are not yet
known, but can only be guessed. Maybe you have some
particular right, maybe you haven't. The only way you can
find out definitely is to see what a court will do about it3
A well-drafted statute may have a political or a social welfare
aim, but it should also aid courts in determining the outcome of future
lawsuits. Seldom does redevelopment, housing code, and, to some
extent, zoning legislation achieve this latter goal. This failing is
indicative of the task of an attorney for private citizens concerned
with matters relating to these laws. It is to make them easier to
litigate: a first step is to render policy decisions, made under the
authority of legislatures and the Congress, ascertainable and thereby
reviewable by courts.
Public agency planners work under the authority of various
statutes and ordinances. These laws give planners a certain amount of
discretion in performing a governmental function recognized as the
"'city planning process," 4 so the empowering legislation is generally
enacted into law as an enumeration and description of the various
1. Some comprehensive plans are also hortatory: others are genuine attempts at polic.
definition.
2. Wilcke. Hottstg Prcram . 1lreadY a Pro.%pective Failure. Ne%% York Times. March 16.
1969, § 3. at I (a recent analysis or the 1968 Act's programs).
3. J. FRANK. COURTS ON TRIAL 9 (1949).
4. There is herein no implication that there is agreement over what the "city planning
process" is, but, in general, a city planner is one who works to improve the quality of urban life
and government through one of his many roles. A planner may see himself either as an urban
designer, idea broker ror the government, politician, trend and issue spotter. efficiency expert or
utopian visionary: however he may concieve of his role, he sees himself as an advocate of govern-
mental actions which deal with urban problems in a "comprehensive way" i.e., considering side
issues and spinoff problems.
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official actions which planners can be expected by the public to take
The 1945 Pennsylvania Urban Redevelopment Law is typical Section
nine provides that a redevelopment authority shall exercise "all
powers necessary or appropriate to carry out and effectuate the
purposes and provisions of this act." As far as the planning powers of
an authority are concerned, that body may "make and asssist in
implementing" five types of plans: (1) voluntary rehabilitation and
conservation programs, (2) code enforcement programs, (3) relocation
plans, (4) redevelopment plans, and (5) feasibility studies for
redevelopment projects. Whether and when such plans are to become
the stated policy of the agency is left undecided On the face of the
statute, they need not be determinative of any future actions taken by
the authority. Apparently, the agency is not even bound by the goals
and provisions of its own plans, and the development of its policies
can only be reviewed "in house"-a situation likely to anger lawyers
and administrators concerned with the due process of law. At some
point after publication, a plan should become agency policy if, for
example, a complaining citizen can show some action taken under its
authority, or if a certain percentage of the affected citizens do not file
a petition stating their objections. (This last suggestion will certainly
force the agency to "think through" its proposals.)
Statutes like this one are also silent on the subject of overseeing
the implementation of plans. Contracts for Urban Renewal projects,
signed by HUD with a local planning agency (LPA), often require the
completion and implementation of various planning studies. By
statute, a relocation plan must be drawn up. However, federal statutes
only require that HUD approve such plans. Plans often sound good
on paper, but are seldom implemented exactly as approved by HUD.
There is little continuing review of their implementation. In addition,
legislation stating that the local agency "shall" formulate and assist
in implementing a plan, does not say who shall decide whether the
agency has carried out what was approved by HUD. Will HUD
approval, once granted, legitimize the plan indefinitely, without
anymore review? Further, if the legislation states that the agency
"may" make certain plans, a threshold question again remains
unanswered: What if the agency does in fact make a plan? Does this
5. Standard Planning Enabling Act, par. 6, DEP'T OF COMMERCE (1928).
6. PA. STAT. AX,*., tit. 35, § 1709, as amended bY Pub. L. No. 125, § 9 (1968).
7. As note I stated, some plans are merely hortatory; they are "trial balloons" that test
the values of those for whom the planning is done. This type of plan could not, immediately
after publication become agency policy. The question becomes, when thereafter may it become
binding upon the agency and how may that policy later be changed'?
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plan ever become a policy binding on the agency implementing it?'
Present legislation obscures these types of legal issues.
Empowering legislation like the Pennsylvania law thus puts the
public on notice that city planners can be expected to use their powers
in any of their enumerated areas of concern, though not necessarily in
all, or in any particular one. In this light, consider the definitions of
"blight" which govern the use of condemnation powers in urban
renewal. Definitions include both "physical" and "environmental"
factors;" indeed, there are so many interchangeable aspects to the
definition of "blight" that it becomes a very flexible term. Even
vacant land can be "blighted"," and this is a finding unexpected
by many laymen. Any city planner can cite instances in which the
definition has been manipulated at will. The up-shot is that the
discretion of the planners really determines the geographic area of an
urban renewal district. Such a determination may or may not fulfill
the public's expectations about city planning. Whether or not it does
is now left up to planners themselves.
This type of legislation has been inherited from an era when
planners were seeking to define their role in society. However, after
these laws are examined from the viewpoint of the planner's clients,
they may come to have a very different function. They may not only
be describing the powers of city planners, but may also be detailing
these same official actions as their "duties" as well. In the event of
such a turnabout, complete execution of these plans accordingly
becomes a duty. In the recent past, for example, relocation has been
the issue which has made planning agencies become more
comprehensive in their planning. It has been the "swing issue"
forcing planners to concede that physical and social planning must be
performed simultaneously. 2 Public outcry has virtually made
provision of "adequate relocation" into a duty for planners.
The juridical basis for such changes has been established in the
work of Harry Jones, Daniel Mandelker, Charles Reich and A. D.
Smith. 3 All of these men are law professors concerned that the rule of
8. Tontro. L rban Renewal Relocation: Prohlemn.% in lIulorcentent ol Conditions on
Federal Grants to Local Agencie%. 117 U. PA. L. RE\. 183 (1968): %ee also. Christy and Coogan.
Fanil" Relocation i L rban Renewal. 82 IARV. L. REv. 864 (1969).
9. See supra note 7.
10. DEP'T OF HOUSING AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT. Project Eligibility 3-1 (1966).
II. This was the case in one urban renewal project in Baltimore. Maryland.
12. NIEBANCK. RELOCATION IN URBAN PLANNING. (1968). Hartman. The Housing ol
Relocated Families, 30 J. AMER. INST. OF PLANNERS 266 (1964) see also the cases cited in notes
38, 39, supra.
13. Smith. Public lssistance. 63 HARV. L. REv. 266 (1949); Jones. The Rule o] Law and
the Wellare State. 58 COLUM. L. RE\. 143 (1958); Mandelker. Judicial Review in General
.Assistance. G. U. PUB. L. 100 (1957); Reich, The .\ew Property. 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964).
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law survive the advent of our planned society. Planning and planning
laws-using the term "planning" in its broadest sense, to include all
legislation relating to the "urban crisis"-affect the lives and fortunes
of countless citizens. The implementation of plans redistributes the
wealth, or opportunities for wealth, offered in our cities." The right to
redevelop an urban renewal area, the contract for government-
sponsored rehabilitation, or a change in zoning permitting more
intensive use of land, are some of the preconditions for urban-based
wealth. Such opportunities are latter-day "property rights".", In
earlier ages, it was enough to own land; today one must also secure
the right to use the land N(hich one wishes to develop. This right to
use is of great value in the hands of those who possess it-be those
people developers, neighborhood groups, or private citizens. Things of
such value should not be distributed without considering the position
of all those who have a reasonable basis to expect to use the land
being redeveloped or conserved. Thus both substantive and procedural
rights to plan for their future arise to protect both present residents
and redevelopers. A corresponding duty to allow such planning is
encumbent on planners.
In sum, the finding of a duty in the law implies that there are
some people toward whom that duty is owed. In the case of the
planner, this means those persons affected by his planning: they have
a "right" to expect full performance of his duty. If this performance
is not forthcoming, those affected may also have the right to obtain a
court order compelling it. Such a plea asks a court to perform a task
for which there is ample precedent in our legal system. People's
expectations have often dictated the outcome of lawsuits. For
instance, contracts are often enforced according to the intentions or
expectations of the parties to it; courts even imply clauses based on
what they consider to be the reasonable expectations of the parties at
the time of contracting. Likewise, in the area of torts, legal concepts
involving the duties of property owners sometimes depend on the
reasonable expectations of guests and licensees. These situations bear
more than a crude analogy to the relationship arising between citizens
and their government when a public program promises more than it
delivers.
The type of expectations about which this paper is now concerned,
the kind recognized at law, often controls substantive provisions of a
14. See particularl. Reich, supra note 13; the view that government is omnipresent in our
lives has been aptly summarized by MOYNIHAN. MAXIM1uMt FEASIBLE MISUNDERSTANDING.
(1969). at xiii: "Not long ago it could be agreed that politics was the business of who gets what,
when, where, how. It is now more than that. It has become a process that also deliberately seeks
to effect such outcomes as who thinks what, who acts when, who lives where, who feels how."
15. REICH. supra note 13, at 785-786; JONES, supra note 13, at 154.
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contract. That is, where the words of the contract are silent on a
particular subject, a court can make a finding as to what the
intentions of the parties were. This decides what actions each will be
required to perform under the contract. In the case of the government
and its citizen beneficiaries, the former cannot argue that it passed a
bill or signed a contract while crossing its fingers behind its back,
saying all the while that it could not make good on all its promises. If
done, that would be of no legal consequence: for it is the impression
that each party has, not their respective inner intentions, that governs
the rights and duties of the parties. Today, citizens are attempting to
see that plans are adequate to their tasks by asserting that their
groups are third-party beneficiaries to the HUD-LPA contracts and
hence entitled to enforce their provisions. In this sense the objectives
stated in the "whereas" or purpose clauses of many types of planning
legislation and contracts can be said to express both the intentions of
the local government toward its citizens and the expectations of those
citizens about their housing.
So citizens' rights can be defined in terms of the expectations of
those for whom planning is intended as a benefit . 7 Jesse Gray, a
tenant group leader in New York City, illustrated this point when
talking about a rent-strike dispute his group was having with
slumlords. He said: "We are going to completely disassociate
ourselves from the slumlords. We are going to pay rent to the city
and expect them to make the repairs.""' Gray was referring to the
protest over housing code violations of some 600 to 1000 tenants on
welfare. He alleged the withholding was legal under New York City's
Rent Strike Law. Clearly his expectations were that the city would
intervene in, and was in some sense responsible for, this conflict
between landlords and tenants.
Yet the public's expectations, if unfilfilled, also have a way of
forcing themselves on the planner either through amendments to the
law or through new interpretations of existing legislation by courts. 9
City planning, like other public programs, has promised much for our
cities. Some of these promises have been redeemed; still others have
proven self-fulfilling; many, however, have neither been redeemed, nor
fulfilled.
16. "Where a city contracts for the benefit of its inhabitants, an individual citizen may
enforce the contract as an intended beneficiary." SIxpsoN. CONTRACTS 317 (1954). The author
includes numerous citations to cases involving municipal contracts with various types of private
utilities.
17. See Reich, supra note 13, at 778-785.
18. Welfare Groups Bar Rent Revolt, New York Times, Dec. 8. 1968: MOYNIHAN. supra
note 14, at 116. has called Gray "an important model for action."
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A word should be said about the underlying political context in
which such expectations normally arise. All of these promises,
whether honored or not, have been made in the context of our pluralist
system of politics. Initially, these promises were arguments advanced
in support of our existing urban programs. The more arguments
amassed behind a program, the more "broadly based in society" and
hence the more "politically feasible" the program appeared to
legislators. In this way, there is a tendency to overburden our public
programs with diverse rationales and justifications, Some are policy-
oriented; some are constitutent-oriented. Thus our Model Cities
Program has something for the advocates of many (often conflicting)
proposals on the reduction of poverty, Thus also our early attempts at
urban renewal were justified as a benefit for rich and poor alike.20
Thus housing code enforcement is often thought of as "cheap urban
renewal", improving the tax-base, providing better housing, etc.21
The overburdening of a public program with divergent rationales
tends to obscure its role subsequent to its authorization.
Administrators have a hard time defining their mandate. Auditors have
a harder time evaluating the effectiveness of the program. And, in the
process, clients or beneficiaries of the program cannot tell what it is
supposed to accomplish for them. Imprecisely defined policies thus
mean that the beneficiary does not know what he is entitled to. He
cannot predict his entitlements. His "right" to benefits which the
program purports to initiate disappears as the administrator tries
harder and harder to achieve a balance between the many objectives
of his program. By reverse token, clarity of policy tends to establish
definite "rights" for the beneficiary.
This short explanation of the legislative process and some of its
administrative consequences should help the reader distinguish
between the official confusion over programs and the public
expectations which result from them. Those who feel that they have
been promised benefits from a program may feel outrage and
frustration while the government makes the difficult choices
postponed during legislative deliberations. Social scientists may
concern themselves with the conflicting goals of programs, but
affected citizens feel that they cannot afford the same detachment.
19. Reich, supra note 13, at 785.
20. Friedman, Welfare Legislation. 21 STAN. L. REV. 217, 219-220 (1969).
21. Other public sector activities are similarly burdened. Educators and social workers in
our larger cities today perform functions for which they are untrained. The social wdrker spends
much time investigating his clients. The educator has been expected to do more than teach: he is
also supposed to counsel and acculturate new Black and Puerto Rican urbanites to the city.
These aspects of the city school systems and the welfare system is probably a major reason why
neither functions well today.
1969]
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Unfortunately, the only point clear about many city planning
programs is the expectations they engender. The creation of these
expectations results from the overselling needed to enact city planning
laws: thereafter, this becomes a problem of one's chickens coming
home to roost. It is in this light that some courts are starting to
decide that planners must perform certain of their obligations or else
have these obligations performed on their behalf. Why? "Because,"
the judges say in effect, "the public has a right to expect performance.
The laws under which planners work have created expectations which
ought to be fulfilled."
In all of this, reference is not being made merely to a right of
clients to participate in the city planning process. "Citizen
participation" is now so well embedded in the law that planners
cannot ignore it, or the problems it raises. The right of participation
may not be effective, however, without changes in tlhe priorities and
processes which planning now utilizes. Thus, to any participatory
rights which clients now have, must be added the right to expect that
planning will fulfill the substantive expectations of its clients as to
substantive policies.
HOUSING CODES
The remainder of this article deals primarily with housing codes.
The discussion will consider the effect of statutes and ordinances upon
planning. Constitutional issues and arguments necessarily enter into
much that is said. When, for example, housing codes and zoning
ordinances are selectively enforced, some rational classification
process must underlie the selection. If none does, than those not
benefited are said to have been denied, in the language of the
Fourteenth Amendment, the "equal protection of the law"? If the
areas of non-enforcement are exclusively black or Puerto Rican,
racial or income discrimination may be a factor in the selection
process. So far as they are able, courts are obliged by our federal
constitution to expunge such selectivity from the planning process.?2
Housing codes are only spottily enforced in our nation's slums, 21
22. Other constitutional provisions may have been violated as well: e.g.. the "due process"
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
23. Yick Ho v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1888), in which a San Francisco ordinance was
struck down by the U.S. Supreme Court because of its affect (though not its words) was to
make it applicable only to the Chinese in the city. Under the ordinance, launderies were excluded
from wooden buildings, and evidence showed that only Chinese launderies were in wooden
buildings.
24. The Housing and Urban Development Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, § 514,
amending 42 U.S.C. § 1453 (1964), recognizes this as a problem by funding programs for
"interim'- code enforcement in areas soon to be rehabilitated or renewed through clearance.
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their enforcement is more likely (and more likely to be encouraged by
planners) in neighborhoods where the population is changing-
racially, ethnicly, or otherwise. In other words, planners have
long been accustomed to the selective enforcement of housing
and sanitary codes. This selectivity has been possible because of a
combination of factors. First, the right to enforce the codes is given
explicitly only to public officials. Second, those who would benefit by
enforcement are often without knowledge of the codes' prescriptions.
The increasing sophistication, however, of the occupants of poor
housing has led to an increasing number of requests and demands that
officials enforce the code standards.
When these requests were denied or unheeded, some people
resorted to the courts. Recent and pending litigation presents three
common situations: 1) a complaint is filed or an affirmative defense
raised asking that the landlord be required to bring dwellings up to
code standards; 2) rents withheld pending repairs; 3) the court asked
by the private citizen to order housing officials to enforce the codes
against named individuals. Most of the relevant cases to date com-
bine these categories in their pleadings. The following paragraphs
summarize, in law-text form, the plaintiff's legal arguments in
each type of case.
Civil Suits To Enjbrce Code Standards
The private citizen's civil suit seeking the landlord's compliance
with code standards has strong legal support. If the codes were not
meant to protect the inhabitants' of the dwellings covered, it is difficult
to see whom they were meant to protect. '8 Moreover, to say that the
class of people protected by the codes cannot insist on the
enforcement of the code's provisions is to violate well-established legal
rules governing the permissible sources of judicially-made contract
and tort law27 It is in our courts that the broad coverage provided in
the codes must be made fully enforceable.
These cases ask, in effect, that the courts adopt the following
three rules: a landlord who initially leases or thereafter collects rent,
without having a certificate of compliance, has abrogated his right to
25. Note, Decent Housing as Constitutional Right: 42 U.S.C. 1983. Poor People's
Rentedr br Deprivation, 14 HOWARD L.J. 338 (1968).
26. Id.
27. On the total aspects of code violation cases, see PROSSER. TORTS 191-205 (3d ed.
1964); and see generally, Sax and Hiestand, Sluinlordisin as a Tort. 65 MICH. L. REV. 869
(1967); Mendozo v. Gonzalez, Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara County, No. 21761, (complaint filed
Jan. 31, 1969). alleging extreme psychological stress on slum tenant and malicious conduct in
maintaining apartment on the part of landlord. The quasi-contract cases in notes 28-31 are
reported in Clearinghouse Review, (now published by the Northwestern Univ. Law School).
1969]
JOURNAL OF URBAN LAW
that rent;2 , a landlord who leases non-complying premises has
negotiated a contract void for reasons of public policy which override
the lease;2 1 finally, a landlord who allows rented premises to
deteriorate into non-compliance has voided his lease. 0
Implied Warranty of HabitabilitY
Where a tenant withholds rent in a situation not covered by a
rent-withholding law, the landlord can argue that he has been deprived
of a "property right"-that of collecting rent."' To counter this, the
tenant may say the lease contained an implied warranty that the
premises are habitable, which warranty has been violated when things
like water, heat, or personal security are not provided by the landlord.
(If the lease makes express warranties, so much the better, but this is
rarely the case.)
If rent-withholding is permitted by statute or ordinance, the
tenant can further argue that the state has made the landlord's right
to collect rent conditional upon the latter's making the premises
"habitable"-or whatever broad legal standard is used. Often the
housing code provides such a standard. Here the state has not
withdrawn or denied the landlord his right; it has only granted it
conditionally upon compliance. In support of this, it should be noted
that rent-withholding legislation often requires the rent to be put in
escrow or deposited with a court official.
28. Goodloe v. Goodman Bros. Co., (now in Cir. Ct., Wayne County, Mich.).
29. Brown v. Southhall Realty Co., 237 A.2d 834 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). held "'where an
owner of dwelling property, knowing housing code violations exist on the property which render
it unsafe and unsanitary, executes a lease for the property, such lease is void and cannot be
enforced." Id. at 837-38. The code violations involved were an obstructed commode, a broken
railing, and insufficient ceiling height in the basement. ' Saunders v. First National Realty
Corporation, 245 A.2d 836 (D.C. Ct. App. 1968). Some of the problems in making the rule of
Brown operational are now coming before the courts: Stone v. Isom, No. 4899 (D.C. Cir. Ct.,
April, 1969) (trial court held that tenant who successfully invoked the defense of "illegal
contract" could have his tenancy terminated only by being given the statutory notice to quit:
Diamond Housing Corp. v. Robinson, No. LT 62391-68 (D.C. Ct. Gen. Sess., 1968) (held, that
a landlord need not be cited by authorities for code violations before he can be precluded from
obtaining a judgment of possession if he knew of the violations when the lease was signed.)
30. Perez v. Russo, No. 206772, Super. Ct., Cal., (filed May 17, 1968: prelim. injunction
issued for plaintiffs). The Brown case was cited with approval in Edwards v. Habib, 397 F.2d
687 (D.C. Cir. 1968) at 702; Edwards is a retaliatory eviction case, and the opinion stated that.
upon deterioration into non-compliance, not only is the lease voided, but the tenant may also
ask that the landlord's certificate of code compliance be revoked, or. at least, not renewed: on
this last point, see Tenants Win Policy Ruling. 3 LAW IN ACTION. No. 6 at 9 (Dec., 1968). in
which it is reported that the Dist. of Colum. Dept. of Licenses and Inspections will not renew
the licenses of non-complying premises.
31. Arguments in the next two paragraphs are made in Goodloe v. Goodman Bros. Co.
and Perez v. Russo, supra notes 27 and 29; see generalli Note, Housing Violations Void
Lease-a New Tenant's Remnedy'. 25 WASH. AND LEE L. REV. (1968); Note. Tenant's Remedies
in the District oJ Columbia-.Vew Hopejor Re/brm. 18 CATH. U. L. REV. 80 (1968).
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Writs of Mandamus to Housing Ojficials
A final series of cases involves a private citizen asking, in a
proceeding for a writ of mandamus, that housing officials be
compelled to enforce the code provisions against named individuals.
This is to say, in effect, that if public officials will not voluntarily
perform their duties, then they should be compelled to do so. In more
general terms, the plaintiff is asking that the city redeem the
"'promise" it made when it passed the code. 2 He is asking that the
housing experts, no matter what their professional judgment tells
them, enforce the code more widely.
These legal arguments and rules, which courts today are being
asked to adopt, put teeth into the codes. They render them more
easily enforceable through litigation. They also suggest the kinds of
provisions which future codes should include. What is really being
sought by the plaintiffs in these cases is predictable governmental
intervention in private real estate transactions, be they leases or sales.
So future provisions might make such transactions legally invalid or
rescindable if the subject of the agreement does not meet code
standards:"' For instance, a building code violation should become an
"encumbrance" on the title and be so recorded on the plat-index. A
statute or ordinance to this effect would facilitate private compliance
with housing codes by precluding sales and new leases; such laws
would protect buyers as well as tenants.
Of course, most slum-tenant problems never reach the courts.
Claims may be made individually, and mass protests are sometimes
attempted first. Lack of heat, inadequate emergency repair service,
poor plumbing, and rent increases have provided the issues for such
protests and rent strikes.Y It is argued by some planners that code
and ancillary public receivership programs do not work in a
slum-whence sprang most of the litigation on which the foregoing
discussion is based. Indeed, the underlying issue may be whether
planners want a receivership program to work at all. Full code
enforcement, some argue, would drive many slumlords out of
business; the government would then have to assume their function,
and supply the housing now provided by private landlords. The
governmental burden thus shouldered would be large indeed. (If the
32. See. e.g., Greenwood v. City of Detroit (pending now in Cir. Ct., Wayne County,
Michigan). A pertinent problem of code enforcement is that of retroactivity: are a code's
provisions retroactive, covering structures built prior to the enactment of the code?
33. LEFCOE. LAND DEVELOPMENT LAW- 271-287 (1966).
34. E.g.. Shipler, Thousands in City Go Without Heat. The New York Times, Dec. 13,
1968. col. I, at 62; WelJare Groups Bar Rent Revolt. N.Y. Times, Dec. 8. 1968 (code violation
repairs protested).
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housing were "public" in some sense, e.g., in public receivership or
owned by a public authority, the question of whether housing codes
are applicable to such dwellings raises new legal problems not
discussed here.) Currently, New York City has title to about 30,000
tracts, only 2,000 of which are commercial. It has seized most of
these through liens. The city's Commissioner of Real Estate predicts a
10% rise in the number of tracts in the city's hands during 1969.
Most of these tracts are and will be in slum areas. Thus the city will
be, at the end of this year, the unwilling landlord of more than 77,000
tenants .
3 5
For the present, however, it should be noted that no code
exempts the slum areas of our cities from coverage. Their
applicability is always city-wide," and city planners are now being
called upon to fulfill the expectations created by the codes under
which they work.
A LOOK AT THE FUTURE
This paper has suggested that some of the procedures which
planners use to deal with redevelopment, sub-standard housing,
and land development are selective, discretionary, and not helpful in
deciding citizens' lawsuits against public officials. City planners and
planning-related functions are coming under increasing judicial
scrutiny. Planners may next be told that they must fulfill more of the
expectations they have created. Recent interpretations of state and
federal constitutions may permit more litigation over city planning
projects. The case law is gradually establishing the right of citizens to
contest and have courts review the policies of planning agencies3 7 The
35. The implications of this idea that no city can afford to take title to deteriorating
properties are developed in Cloward and Piven, Dissensus Politics. THE NEW REPUBLIC (April
20, 1968). (These authors reason that city officials and landlords are in collusion to block code
enforcement in the slums.) See Bennett, City Properties Continue to Grow. N.Y. Times. Dec.
14, 1968).
36. E.g.: NEW HAVEN HOUSING CODE, § 300, begins: "No person shall occupy as owner-
occupant or let to another any dwelling or dwelling unit . . ." Subsequent sub-paragraphs
begin: "Every dwelling ... ".(Quoted fron MANDELKER. MANAGING OUR URBAN
ENVIRON\IENT 657.
37. Neither have social planners fulfilled the expectations of either their clients or the
courts. That is why, today, courts are in the process of reviewing de jacto segregation in urban
education. See. e.g.. Hobson v. Hansen, 265 F. Supp. 902 (1967). noted in 16 AMIER. U. L. REV.
426 (1967); 81 HARV. L. REV. 702 (1967); courts are also reviewing the conditions which social
workers impose on public assistance payments. The literature on the "welfare rights' movement
is, by now, extensive. See Cloward and Elamn, Poverty. Injustice. and the Welfare S)'stem. Part
I. THE NATION (Feb. 28, 1966); Part II. THE NATION (Mar. 7, 1966); subsequent articles on
welfare and housing appeared in THE NEW REPUBLIC and THE NATION through November.
1968. See also: Reich, Individual Rights and Social Welfare: the Emerging Legal Issues. 74
YALE L.J. 1245 (1965).
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most successful of these cases, from the private plaintiff's point of
view, in the field of Urban Renewal, are Powelton Village
Home Owners Association v. H.U.D.:3 and Norwalk Congress of
Racial Equality v. Norwalk Redevelopment Authority .3 In both
cases, the plaintiffs, citizens seeking to dispute the policy
determinations of state and federal renewal and housing authorities,
were allowed to challenge location decisions for public housing
projects and urban renewal districts in open court. The Norwalk court
found the claims of racial discrimination made therein to be without
merit, but the important holding of each case is that the court
admitted that the plaintiffs had standing to sue. A 1968 decision of
the United States Supreme Court makes this result an unshakeable
part of our constitutional law. Flast v. Cohen40 held that a citizen,
acting as a taxpayer and without suffering any further financial injury
than the payment of his taxes would entail, is entitled to contest the
legality of 'a governmental policy. This case will undoubtedly make
taxpayer's suits more common in the future, and will eventually
provide authority for contesting the application of and administration
housing and zoning policies to unwilling citizens. Furthermore, the
rule of Flast can be used to great advantage in class actions brought
by citizens seeking broad code enforcement.
But the judicial opinion having the greatest impact on the city
planning process-which, as is implicit in much of this discussion, is
too often the captive of local politics-was handed down in Chicago
in July of this year. Aldermen in that city have long enjoyed the
power to veto the erection of public housing in their wards. Now,
however, the Chicago Housing Authority is under an order, issued by
Federal District Court Judge Richard Austin, to build 75% of all its
future housing at least one mile from present Chicago ghettos and in
areas that are 70% white. This case represents more than a guideline
for planners working with the Authority; it is a constraint on their
decision-making, solving, as it were, the planners' policy dilemma
between "ghetto enrichment" and integration in favor of the latter.4'
The following federal statute might be also become part of
this same trend toward increased judicial scrutiny of the planning
process:
Every person, who under color of any statute, ordinance,
38. 284 F. Supp. 809 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
39. 42 F.R.D. 617 (1967), rev'd 395 F. 20, 920 (1968).
40. 42 F.R.D. 617, rev'd 395 F.2d 920 (2nd Cir. 1968); see also Garrett v. City of
Hamtramck, civ. action 32004 (E.D. Mich. 1969).
41. 88 U.S. 1942 (1968). noted in 35 BROOKLYN L. REv. 94 (1968), 82 HARV. L. Rvv.
224 (1968).
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regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory,
subjects or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the
deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action of law, suit in equity
or other proper, proceeding for redress.12
This statute has been broadly interpreted by courts. It has been used
to protect civil rights advocates and workers in the south from police
harassment and mobs. It has been used to enforce integration of a
restaurant on land rented from a city. There is thus ample precedent
for its reaching public employees of various types, including planners
whose inaction on housing codes is surely a "deprivation" of a right
to expect governmental action to enforce the codes."
This statute, or others like it, may also take some pressure off
the center-city housing market by providing legal support for
integrating suburbs and enforcing central city housing codes. For
example, fear of future development is one of the mainstays of the
present system of zoning. Today, zoning districts operate to exclude
large portions of the population, classified by income or race, from
ever larger sectors of our housing market. Land accessible to jobs and
cultural centers around our cities is becoming an increasingly scarce-
resource; evidence of this is the rapid rise in the land-component
factor of recent new construction-from 10-12% of total cost in 1960
to over 20% recently.44 Density requirements, like one to four acre
minimum zoning, now operate to deny some sectors of the housing
market an equal opportunity to use the most essential precondition
of modern, efficient housing-land on which to put it.
CONCLUSION
Statutes and ordinances concerned with redevelopment, minimum
housing standards, and auxiliary programs (like receivership and prior
lien laws) give the public the impression that they are applicable to all
dwellings within the jurisdiction. In fact, they are not. Housing codes
are enforced under standards not found in any legislation. In theory,
their applicability is city-wide. In fact, the discretion of the planners,
42. Gautreux v. Chicago Housing Authority, No. 66 C 1459 (N.D. Ill. 1969: opinion
dated Feb. 10, 1969) at 17: "It is also undenied that sites for the projects which have been
constructed were chosen primarily to further the praiseworthy and urgent goals of low cost
housing and urban renewal. Nevertheless. a deliberate policy to separate the races cannot be
justified by the good intentions with which other laudable goals are pursued." The court's order
was issued July I. 1969.
43. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).
44. For a more detailed review of this statute, see Friedman, supra note 20.
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the economic feasibility of rehabilitation, and the relationship between
landlords and the city determine the extent of actual enforcement.
Under housing code receivership laws, the legislative standard for
enforcement is the habitability of the building; the real standard is the
economic feasibility of rehabilitation.
In each case, the real standard is more selective than the
legislative or theoretical one. It is the first job of the planners to
harmonize the two. In the alternative, he should urge that all of the
planning legislation involved be redrafted using either the real standard
or the standard which the public has been led to expect. It is more
likely, however, that litigation between citizens and a planning agency
will increase, and courts will accordingly develop expertise in
identifying more precisely the public policies for which officials and
planners have a statutory mandate. Rules of court may be required, in
the end to, make our planning laws fully subject to litigation.
Much' of what has been written here is directed at both lawyers
and planners. Our legal system has too long regarded "public law" as
something distinct from the legal rules governing events and
transactions between private citizens. In an age when the government
is exerting more and more control over the private sector, the two
sectors of our law should be fused. This paper has attempted to
suggest a jurisprudential basis for doing this in the field of urban
affairs. But it is no longer enough to say that public law and private
law should be combined. The question is, under what theory should
the fusion take place? The expectations theory suggested here may
prove appropriate for this task.
45. See Lefcoe, Savings Associations as Land Developers, 75 YALE L.J. 1271 (1966).
